On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior by Barman, Siddharth et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
31
1.
26
55
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  2
6 S
ep
 20
14
On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for
Mixed Strategy Behavior
Siddharth Barman∗ Umang Bhaskar † Federico Echenique ‡ Adam Wierman §
Abstract
Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic
settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the prob-
lem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the players for which the equilibrium corresponds
to observed player behavior. Computational complexity of Nash equilibria is an important
consideration in this framework. If the instance of the model that explains observed player
behavior requires players to have solved a computationally hard problem, then the explanation
provided is questionable. In this paper we provide conditions under which Nash equilibrium is
a reasonable explanation for strategic behavior, i.e., conditions under which observed behavior
of players can be explained by games in which Nash equilibria are easy to compute. We identify
three structural conditions and show that if the data set of observed behavior satisfies any of
these conditions, then it is consistent with payoff matrices for which the observed Nash equilibria
could have been computed efficiently. Our conditions admit large and structurally complex data
sets of observed behavior, showing that even with complexity considerations, Nash equilibrium
is often a reasonable model.
1 Introduction
The computational complexity of equilibria in economic models is at the core of recent research
in algorithmic game theory. In general, the basic message of this research is negative: Computing
Nash equilibria is PPAD-complete even for 2-player games [10], and computing Walrasian equilibria
is PPAD-hard [9, 27]. The fact that the standard notions of equilibrium used by economists are
hard to compute raises a concern that they are flawed models for economic behavior, because they
lack a plausible rationale for how one would arrive at equilibrium.
These hardness results have motivated the study of instances in which equilibrium can be
computed efficiently, e.g., [1,13,14]. These results — both positive and negative — assume a fixed
and literal interpretation of economic models. For example, in two-player games the assumption
is that payoff matrices are explicitly specified, and agents seek to maximize their payoffs given the
strategy of the other player.
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However, models are frequently used as explanations of behavior, rather than literal descriptions.
In empirical applications of game theory, for example, one rarely observes payoffs of the players.
Rather, what we observe is the behavior of the players, and a first-order task is to determine if the
model explains observed behavior or not (see, e.g., [7, 8] for classical examples of this exercise). In
particular, a good model instance (i.e., payoffs specification) is one where the observed behavior
of the players is as if they were playing equilibrium. This is certainly how economists use game
theory: as a modeling tool to explain observed behavior.
This perspective however cannot ignore computational complexity. Even if a model explains
observed behavior, it is unreasonable if it requires players to solve computationally hard problems.
Thus, an important question that arises from the perspective of models as explanations of observed
behavior and the computational complexity of equilibrium is: when is an economic model a reason-
able explanation for observed behavior? We address this question in the context of Nash equilibrium
as a model for two-player games, and computational complexity as a measure of reasonableness.
This framework of starting with observed behavior is consistent with much of economics, and is
formalized in revealed preference theory, which was pioneered by Samuelson in 1938 [22] and has a
long tradition in economics (see, e.g., [3, 23–26]). Classical revealed preference theory asks, “Does
there exist an instance of the model that is consistent with the observed behavior?” If there is
such a model instance, then the observed behavior is said to be consistent with the theory, and
thus rationalizable. Our work augments the fundamental question of rationalizability in revealed
preference theory with complexity considerations. The question we address is then, “Does there
exist an instance of the model that is consistent with the observed behavior and for which the
observations could have been computed efficiently?”
We focus on addressing this question in the context of bimatrix games. We consider a setting
where mixed strategy behavior (i.e., probability distributions over the actions of the players) is
observed. In particular, with multiple instances of mixed strategy behavior as input, we want to
know if there is some tractable instance of the game such that the given observations correspond to
Nash equilibria. We focus on low player rank — the minimum of the ranks of the payoff matrices
of the players — as our notion of tractability given recent algorithmic results, e.g., [13]. We defer
a discussion of our modeling assumptions and their relaxations to Section 6.
It is important to be clear about what we do not do. We do not address a problem of inference;
we do not claim to estimate or back out any instance of the game. Our focus is on the problem of
testing: When can a dataset be explained by equilibrium behavior for which there is a story (an
efficient algorithm) for how players could have arrived at the equilibrium? The existence of such an
explanation does not imply that the explanation is unique; indeed there may be other explanations
with different properties, a common situation in revealed preference theory. Our results say that
one can quite often find explanations for economic behavior which do not require agents to solve
computationally hard problems. Hence in such settings Nash equilibria, even with complexity
considerations, remains an applicable model of behavior.
Summary of results. Broadly, the results in this paper show that large and structurally complex
data sets of observations — including data sets with overlapping observed strategies, each of which
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may be an arbitrary distribution — can be rationalized by games that admit efficient computation
of the observed Nash equilibria. Specifically, we identify three measures of structural complexity
in data sets, and show that if a data set has a low value on any one of these measures for either
player, or can be partitioned in a manner such that each partition has a low value on any one of
these measures, then it has a rationalization with low player rank. The three measures we study are
(i) the dimensionality of the observed strategies (Theorem 2), (ii) the support size of the observed
strategies (Theorem 3), and (iii) the chromatic number of the data set (Theorem 4). We believe
these are natural and complementary measures to evaluate the structural complexity of a data set,
and our contribution is to show that each of these measures individually translates to the existence
of rationalizing games with low player rank.
Finally, we also show that the bounds we obtain on the player rank for these measures are nearly
tight by giving an example of a data set that necessitates high player rank for any rationalization
(Theorem 5).
Related work. This paper seeks to incorporate computational complexity as a measure of rea-
sonableness of models (which are used to explain observed behavior) in the context of bimatrix
games. This general direction was initiated in the context of consumer choice theory [11]. In this
context it was shown that a data set of n observations of a consumer choosing among d indivisible
goods can always be explained by a consumer utility function that can be optimized in O(nd) time.
Thus, despite the fact that the consumer choice problem is NP-hard, consumer choice data is not
rich enough to expose computationally hard utility functions without an exponentially large data
set.
The question was also asked in the context of bimatrix games in [5]; however the focus in that
work was on pure strategy equilibria and so differs from the current paper, which focuses on mixed
strategy equilibria. In [5], the core problem is not computationally hard, and so the focus is on
the structural complexity of the rationalizing game, as formalized via game rank.1 In contrast, the
purpose of the current paper is to develop a connection between the structural richness of the data
and the computational complexity of the game.
This problem at hand is significantly more difficult and technically involved than the ones solved
in [11] and [5]. To highlight this, note that, there are no results in the revealed preference literature
characterizing which data sets can be explained as mixed Nash equilibria. So, our results represent
a contribution to pure economic theory, as well as to algorithmic game theory.
2 Preliminaries
Bimatrix Games. Bimatrix games are two player games in normal form. Such games are specified
by a pair of matrices (A,B) of size n×n, which are termed the payoff matrices for the players. The
first player, also called the row player, has payoff matrix A, and the second player, or the column
player, has payoff matrix B. The strategy set for each player is [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and, if the row
1Game rank is defined to be the rank of the sum of the payoff matrices of the players. On the other hand, player
rank is the minimum of the ranks of the payoff matrices of the players.
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player plays strategy i and column player plays strategy j, then the payoffs of the two players are
Aij and Bij respectively. The player rank of game (A,B) is defined to be min{rank(A), rank(B)}.
Our focus on player rank stems from a number of important properties. In particular, if a game
has player rank k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, then an equilibrium can be computed in time O(nO(k)) [13,15].
Let ∆n be the set of probability distributions over the set of pure strategies [n]. For x ∈ ∆n,
we define Supp(x) := {i : xi > 0}. Further, ei ∈ R
n is the vector with 1 in the ith coordinate
and 0’s elsewhere, and uk ∈ ∆
n is the uniform distribution over the set {1, 2, . . . , k}. The players
can randomize over their strategies by selecting any probability distribution in ∆n, called a mixed
strategy. When the row and column players play mixed strategies x and y respectively, the expected
payoff of the row player is xTAy and the expected payoff of the column player is xTBy.
Given a mixed strategy y ∈ ∆n for the column player, the best-response set of the row player,
βr, is defined as βr(y) := {i ∈ [n] | e
T
i Ay ≥ e
T
kAy ∀k ∈ [n]}. Similarly, the best-response
set, βc, of the column player (against mixed strategy x ∈ ∆
n of the row player) is defined as
βc(x) := {j ∈ [n] | x
TBej ≥ x
TBek ∀k ∈ [n]}. The best response sets βr and βc are defined with
respect to the payoff matrices A and B. When we want to emphasize this fact we use superscripts:
βAr and β
B
c .
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). A pair of mixed strategies (x, y), x, y ∈ ∆n, is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if:
xTAy ≥ eTi Ay ∀i ∈ [n] and
xTBy ≥ xTBej ∀j ∈ [n].
The Nash equilibrium is strict if additionally the support and the best-response sets are equal, i.e.,
Supp(x) = βr(y) and Supp(y) = βc(x). Thus, for strict Nash equilibrium x
TAy > eTi Ay for all
i /∈ Supp(x) and xTBy > xTBej for all j /∈ Supp(y).
Observed behavior. We consider settings in which the payoff matrices A and B are not explicitly
specified. Instead, we are given a collection of observed mixed strategy pairs. Our framework of
observing mixed strategies is entirely analogous to the theory of individual stochastic choice: see for
example [16–19]. The idea is that repeated observation of pure play allows one to infer a probability
distribution over pure strategies.
A data set D (of size m) is a collection of mixed-strategy pairs, D = {(xk, yk) ∈ ∆
n ×∆n | k ∈
[m]}. We refer to mixed-strategy pairs (xk, yk) as observations.
We denote the set of observed mixed strategies of the row and column player in a data set
D by Or(D) and Oc(D) respectively: Or(D) := {x ∈ ∆
n | ∃y ∈ ∆n such that (x, y) ∈ D} and
Oc(D) := {y ∈ ∆
n | ∃x ∈ ∆n such that (x, y) ∈ D}. When there is a single data set under
consideration, for ease of notation, we simply refer to these sets as Or and Oc.
3 Warmup result: Rationalization
Given observed behavior (data) as described in the previous section, the first-order goal of classical
revealed preference theory is to understand whether the data is rationalizable.
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Definition 2 (Rationalizable Data). A data set D = {(xk, yk)}k is rationalizable if there exist
payoff matrices A and B such that for all k, (xk, yk) is a strict Nash equilibrium in the game
(A,B).
Strictness is required in the above definition in order to avoid rationalization by trivial games.
The first result of this paper comes from the observation that rationalizability of a given data
set can be expressed as a linear program, and can thus be determined efficiently. In fact, the use
of a linear program is a robust tool, and allows us to determine rationalizability in many more
settings, such as:
• Rationalizability by payoff matrices that satisfy given linear constraints, e.g., enforcing values
for certain payoffs, or inequalities between payoffs.
• Games with multiple players. Each player now has a m-dimensional payoff tensor, where m
is the number of players.
• Data sets that consist of observed player behavior in subgames. Each observation thus consists
of a tuple (Ik, Jk, xk, yk), where Ik, Jk ⊆ [n] are subsets of the available pure strategies and
Supp(xk) ⊆ Ik, Supp(yk) ⊆ Jk.
• Rationalization of the data set as ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria.
For simplicity of notation, we give the linear program for the basic case of two players; this can
easily be extended to any of the above cases. The variables in the linear program are the entries of
the payoff matrices A and B, and the payoffs πk, π
′
k obtained by the players for each observation
(xk, yk) in the data set.
Proposition 1. A data set D = {(xk, yk) ∈ ∆
n ×∆n | 1 ≤ k ≤ m} is rationalizable iff the optimal
value of (LP) is strictly greater than zero.
maximize δ
subject to (Ayk)i = πk ∀k,∀i ∈ Supp(xk)
(Ayk)j ≤ πk − δ ∀k,∀j /∈ Supp(xk)
(xTkB)i = π
′
k ∀k,∀i ∈ Supp(yk)
(xTkB)j ≤ π
′
k − δ ∀k,∀j /∈ Supp(yk)
0 ≤ Ai,j , Bi,j ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ [n]
δ ≥ 0.
(LP)
Proof. If the optimal value of the linear program is strictly greater than zero then we have matrices
A and B (corresponding to an optimal solution) under which the observations (xk, yk) are strict
Nash equilibrium. Hence D is rationalizable.
On the other hand, if D is rationalizable, say via game (Aˆ, Bˆ), then we can scale the entries of
Aˆ and Bˆ (by a large enough positive constant) and add a fixed number to all of them to obtain
a (normalized) game (A,B) with entries between 0 and 1. Since such an affine transformation
preserves the set of strict Nash equilibria, D is also rationalized by (A,B). In other words, (A,B)
gives us a feasible solution to the linear program with objective function value strictly greater than
zero. This establishes the claim.
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4 Main Results: Rationalizations with Low Player Rank
This section includes the main results of the paper, which identify structural properties of data
sets that guarantee the existence of rationalizations for which the observed Nash equilibria can
be computed efficiently. To ensure that the observed equilibria can be computed efficiently in the
rationalizations we construct rationalizations with low player rank and make use of the following
result from [13].
Theorem 1 ([13]). If the player rank of a bimatrix game is k then all extreme Nash equilibria can
be computed in time O(nO(k)).
The algorithm implicit in this theorem computes all extreme equilibria, and so it can be used
to compute the observations in the data set rather than simply some arbitrary equilibria. This fact
is crucial to the exercise, and provides strong motivation for a focus on player rank, since the goal
is to explain the specific observations in the data set.
4.1 Observations from a Low Dimensional Subspace
The first property we connect to player rank is the dimensionality of the observed strategies in the
data set. Given a finite set S ⊂ Rn of m vectors s1, . . . , sm, write dim(S) to denote the maximum
number of linearly independent vectors in S. Observed strategies that form a low dimensional
subspace are natural candidates for low player rank rationalizations and, the following theorem
shows that — independent of the size of the data set — if the observations form a low dimensional
subspace then they can be rationalized by a game of low player rank.
Theorem 2. If a data set D is rationalizable then it can be rationalized by a game of player rank
at most min{dim(Or), dim(Oc)}.
An immediate consequence of the above theorem is that, if a data set D is rationalizable, then
it can be rationalized by a game of player rank at most |D|. Additionally, later, in Theorem 5, we
prove a lower bound that highlights that this result is tight.
Importantly, Theorem 2 has rationalizability as one of its hypotheses, and thus implies that,
for data with low-dimensional strategies, the computational constraints have no added empirical or
observational content. In other words, any low dimensional data set that is rationalizable without
computational constraints is also rationalizable with them.
To prove Theorem 2, a key technical piece is the following lemma about reconstructing the
product of an arbitrary matrix and a low-rank matrix.
Lemma 1. Suppose Y ∈ Rn×m is a matrix of rank t. Then for every matrix Aˆ ∈ Rn×n, there
exists a matrix A ∈ Rn×n of rank at most t that satisfies AY = AˆY .
Proof. Let {y1, y2, . . . , yt} be a set of linearly independent columns in Y , and define Yˆ as the n× t
matrix [y1 y2 . . . yt]. Since each of the columns of Yˆ are linearly independent, we can obtain a
matrix Γ of size n × t that satisfies ΓT Yˆ = It. Thus if we denote the ith column of Γ by γi, then
for all j ∈ [t],
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γTj yj = 1 and
γTj yk = 0 ∀k ∈ [t] \ {j} .
We define matrix A as the following sum of t rank-1 outer products:
A =
t∑
j=1
Aˆyjγ
T
j .
By construction, the rank of A is at most t. Further, for all yj for j ∈ [t]:
Ayj =
t∑
k=1
Aˆykγ
T
k yj = Aˆ yj . (1)
Since any column y of matrix Y can be expressed as a linear combination of the columns of Yˆ ,
we can write y =
∑t
j=1 λjyj . Then Aˆ yi is given by
Aˆ y = Aˆ


t∑
j=1
λjyj

 =
t∑
j=1
λjAˆyj =
t∑
j=1
λjAyj
= A


t∑
j=1
λjyj

 = Ay .
where the third equality is obtained from (1). Overall we have the desired claim, AY = AYˆ .
Using this lemma, Theorem 2 can be established as follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a game (Aˆ, Bˆ) that rationalizes the data set D = {(xk, yk)}
m
k=1.
Write X (Y ) to denote the matrix whose kth row (column) is equal to xk (yk), for all k ∈ [m].
Note that rank(X) = dim(Or) and rank(Y ) = dim(Oc). By Lemma 1, there exist matrices A, B
so that rank(A) ≤ rank(Y ), rank(B) ≤ rank(X), and AY = AˆY , XB = XBˆ. Then (A,B) is the
rationalization required by the theorem. We have already shown that A and B are of the required
rank. To see that (A,B) rationalize D, note that since AY = AˆY , for all (x, y) ∈ D we have
βAr (y) = β
Aˆ
r (y). Hence Supp(x) = β
A
r (y). Similarly, since XB = XBˆ, Supp(y) = β
B
c (x). Hence
(x, y) is a strict Nash equilibrium in (A,B).
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4.2 Observations with Small Support Size
The second structural property of the data set we consider is the support size of the observations. In
spirit, the following theorem complements the result of Lipton et al. [15] wherein they establish that
if the rank of both the payoff matrices is low then the game contains a small-support equilibrium.
The following result highlights that there is a connection in the other direction as well.
Theorem 3. Let D = {(xk, yk) ∈ ∆
n × ∆n | 1 ≤ k ≤ m} be a data set in which |Supp(xk)| ≤ s
for all k ∈ [m] or |Supp(yk)| ≤ s for all k ∈ [m]. If the observed strategies Or(D) and Oc(D) are
generic then D can be rationalized by a game with player rank ≤ 2s + 1.
Note that, later, Theorem 5 highlights that the bound in Theorem 3 is tight to within a factor
of 2.
Our proof of Theorem 3 uses a construction based on polynomials, and the following lemma is
a key technical piece in the argument. The lemma states that if for all j ∈ [m], the jth column of
an n ×m matrix M is obtained by evaluating a degree d polynomial pj at 1, 2, . . . n (i.e., the jth
column of M is equal to (pj(1), pj(2), . . . , pj(n))
T ), then the rank of M is at most d+ 1.
Lemma 2. Let p1, p2, . . . , pm be m univariate polynomials over R, and suppose that the degree of
each of them is at most d. If the (i, j)th entry of an n×m matrix M is equal to pj(i), for all i ∈ [n]
and j ∈ [m], then the rank of M is at most d+ 1.
Proof. Write pj(x) = a
(j)
d x
d + a
(j)
d−1x
d−1 + . . .+ a
(j)
1 x+ a0 for all j ∈ [m]. M can be expressed as a
sum of d+ 1 outer products:
M =


1d
2d
...
nd


(
a
(1)
d a
(2)
d · · · a
(m)
d
)
+


1d−1
2d−1
...
nd−1


(
a
(1)
d−1 a
(2)
d−1 · · · a
(m)
d−1
)
+ . . .
. . .+


1
1
...
1


(
a
(1)
0 a
(2)
0 · · · a
(m)
0
)
.
Note that the rank of an outer product is one and the rank of the sum of two matrices satisfies
rank(X + Y ) ≤ rank(X) + rank(Y ). Hence the rank of M is no more than d+ 1.
Using this lemma, Theorem 3 can be established as follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove the claim for the case in which the mixed strategies of the row player
in the data set D = {(xk, yk) ∈ ∆
n×∆n | 1 ≤ k ≤ m} are of support size at most s. A construction
similar to the one presented below takes care of the alternate case wherein |Supp(yk)| ≤ s for each
k ∈ [m].
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We consider a polynomial pk that satisfies argmaxx pk(x) = Supp(xk) and has degree 2|Supp(xk)|.
In particular,
pk(x) := −
∏
i∈Supp(xk)
(x− i)2.
Say Supp(xk) = {i1, i2, . . . , is} ⊂ [n], then the polynomial pk vanishes exactly at i1, i2, . . . , is
and is negative elsewhere. Hence, Supp(xk) is the set of points at which pk attains its maximum
value. In addition, the degree of pk is 2|Supp(xk)|.
Consider the n×m matrix P in which the kth column is equal to (pk(1), pk(2), ..., pk(n))
T . By
construction, for all k ∈ [m], degree of the polynomial pk is no more than 2s. Therefore, Lemma 2
implies that the rank of P is at most 2s+1. Moreover, the set of the largest components of the kth
column of P (i.e., argmaxi Pi,k) is exactly equal to Supp(xk). Since, argmaxi∈[n] Pi,k = argmaxi∈[n]
pk(i) = Supp(xk).
Recall that the mixed strategies in Oc(D) are generic. Therefore, we can find an m×n matrix V
that satisfies the following equality for all yk ∈ Oc(D): V yk = e
(m)
k . Here e
(m)
k is the m-dimensional
vector with a 1 in the kth coordinate and 0s elsewhere.
Set the payoff matrix of the row player A = PV . Rank of the product of two matrices satisfies:
rank(XY ) ≤ min{rank(X), rank(Y )}. Hence rank(A) ≤ 2s+ 1.
For all (xk, yk) ∈ D, we have Ayk = Pe
(m)
k = (pk(1), pk(2), . . . , pk(n))
T . Hence, the set of the
largest components of the vector Ayk is equal to Supp(xk). Overall, under the payoff matrix A, we
have βr(yk) = Supp(xk), for all (xk, yk) ∈ D. That is, A rationalizes the mixed strategies of the
row player.
4.3 Observations with Low Chromatic Number
The third, and final, structural property of data sets that we consider is the chromatic number.
Intuitively, the chromatic number quantifies the degree of intersection between the observed mixed
strategies, and hence it is a relevant measure of the structural complexity of data.
For a data set D, we define the row chromatic number κr(D) and the column chromatic number
κc(D) as the chromatic numbers of graphs Gr and Gc, defined as follows. For the row chromatic
number, κr(D), construct graph Gr with a vertex corresponding to each observation in Or. For
distinct observations (x, y) and (x′, y′) in D, if Supp(x) ∩ Supp(x′) 6= ∅ then the graph Gr has an
edge between the corresponding vertices. Then set κr(D) = χ(Gr), i.e., the chromatic number of
graph Gr. The column chromatic number is defined similarly using intersections Supp(y)∩Supp(y
′).
The chromatic number of the data set, κ(D), is defined to be the minimum of κr(D) and κc(D).
Theorem 4. Let D be a data set with chromatic number equal to κ(D). If the observed mixed-
strategy sets Or(D) and Oc(D) are generic then D can be rationalized by a game of player rank at
most 2κ(D).
Note that, later, Theorem 5 highlights that the bound in Theorem 3 is tight to within a factor
of 2.
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Importantly, like the case of support size, the bound on the player rank in Theorem 4 is not
exactly dependent on the size of the data set, but rather only on the “richness” of the observations
in terms of the structure of the underlying graph.
Of course, in general the chromatic number of a graph is hard to compute. However, an
easy upper bound is the maximum degree of any vertex in Gr and Gc plus one, which then can
be interpreted as follows: κr(D) ≤ max(x,y)∈D |{(x
′, y′) ∈ D : Supp(x) ∩ Supp(x′) 6= φ}| and
κc(D) ≤ max(x,y)∈D |{(x
′, y′) ∈ D : Supp(y) ∩ Supp(y′) 6= φ}|. Though these bounds provide
intuition, it is obvious the chromatic numbers can be much less than these upper bounds, e.g., if
the graph Gr is a star.
The proof of Theorem 4 starts by focusing on data sets where the row chromatic number is
one, i.e., the supports of all the observations for the row player are pairwise disjoint. In this case
we show, in the following Lemma, that the data set can be rationalized by a game with row player
rank 2. We start with a proof of the initial lemma.
Lemma 3. Let D′ be a data set with row chromatic number κr(D
′) = 1. If the set of observations
Oc(D
′) is generic then there exists a rank 2 matrix A′ that rationalizes the row player’s strategies
in D′.
Proof. Say D′ consists of m observations (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym). Since the support sets of the strate-
gies of the row player are disjoint, any (pure) strategy i ∈ [n] of the row player is in at most one
such support set. For pure strategy i ∈ [n], let σ(i) := k such that i ∈ Supp(xk). If row i is not in
the support of any strategy, let σ(i) = m+ 1.
We construct three vectors u, w and f in Rn. Values are assigned to the components of the
vectors u and w directly: for i ∈ [n], entry ui = −σ(i)
2, and wi = σ(i). We define vector f so that
for all yk ∈ Oc(D
′), fTyk = k. Since the set of observations Oc(D
′) are generic, such a vector f
exists and can be obtained. Matrix A′ is then defined as follows: A′ := u1Tn + 2wf
T , where 1n is
the n-column vector consisting of all 1’s.
Since A′ is the sum of two outer products, it has rank 2. We show that with payoffs from A′
the strict Nash requirement for the row player, Supp(xk) = βr(yk), is satisfied for all (xk, yk) ∈ D
′.
Hence, we get the desired lemma.
For any yk ∈ Oc(D
′) , by our construction, A′yk = u + 2wf
T yk = u + 2kw. For a fixed k,
consider the jth component of the vector A′yk, which by the construction is −σ(j)
2 + 2kσ(j).
Note that this expression is maximized when σ(j) = k and is strictly less for other values of σ(j).
Further, by construction, if σ(j) = k then j ∈ Supp(xk). Thus, the maximum components of
A′yk are exactly those that correspond to the support of xk, and hence under payoff matrix A
′,
βr(yk) = Supp(xk).
We show now how this lemma can then be used to construct games with low player rank for
data sets with larger chromatic numbers.
Proof of Theorem 4. We constructively show that there exists a matrix A that rationalizes the
mixed strategies of the row player in D and has rank no more than 2κr(D). Similarly, we can
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construct a payoff matrix B of rank at most 2κc(D) for the column player. This establishes the
existence of the game (A,B) that rationalizes D with the required player rank.
Let t be the row chromatic number of the data set, i.e., t = κr(D), and let χ(Gr) be the graph
coloring that defines the row chromatic number. We partition the observations in data set D into t
sets D1,D2, . . . ,Dt according to the color assigned to the vertex corresponding to each observation,
so that observations with the same color are in the same partition. Note that by this technique,
for all observations within the same partition, the supports of the observations for the row player
are disjoint.
By Lemma 3, for each data set Dj , we can obtain a rank-2 matrix Aj so that βr(yi) = Supp(xi)
with Aj as the payoff matrix. In order to combine these matrices, for j ∈ [t], we define matrix Vj
as satisfying the following property:
Vjy = y for y ∈ Oc(Dj), and
Vjy = 0 otherwise.
Since the set of strategies of the players are generic, we can obtain such matrices. We then define
the payoff matrix A as A =
∑t
j=1AjVj . Since each Aj is of rank 2, matrix A is of rank 2t = 2κr(D
′).
To see that A rationalizes the data set D, note that for j ∈ [t] and (x, y) ∈ Dk, Ay =
∑t
j=1AjVjy =
Aky, and by construction of Ak, βr(y) = Supp(x).
4.4 A Unifying Result
The previous sections have identified three structural properties for data sets that ensure the exis-
tence of low player rank rationalizations. In this section, we present a unifying result that extends
the previous three theorems to provide a more robust low-rank construction and, in particular,
shows that addition of a small number of observations to a data set does not have a big impact on
the player rank necessary to rationalize the data. Specifically, we establish low-rank rationaliza-
tions for data sets that can be partitioned into three sets which are structurally simple in terms of
dimensionality, support size, and chromatic number, respectively. For example, say we have a data
set D in which all but t observed mixed strategies are of support size s, then it can be partitioned
into a set that has support bounded by s and a set that has dimensionality bounded by t (and an
empty set that has chromatic number zero). The following corollary then shows how to construct
a rationalization for D of player rank at most (2s+ 1) + t.2
To obtain such a generalization we introduce the notion of the composite number of a data set,
which considers a 3-partition of the data set and combines the dimensionality of the first partition,
the support size of the second partition, and the chromatic number of the third partition.
Definition 3 (Composite number). The row composite number σr(D) of a data set D is defined
to be the smallest number for which there exists a 3-partition of D, {D1,D2,D3}, that satisfies
2The precise bound from the corollary is 2(s + t) + 1, but this can be strengthened to (2s + 1) + t. For ease of
presentation, we present the corollary with slightly loose factors.
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dim(Oc(D1)) + max(x,y)∈D2 |Supp(x)| + κr(D3) = σr(D). The column composite number σc(D) is
defined similarly.
The composite number of a data set, σ(D), is the minimum of the row and column composite
number: σ(D) := min{σr(D), σc(D)}.
Corollary 1. Let D be a data set with composite number σ(D). If the observed mixed-strategy
sets Or(D) and Oc(D) are generic then D can be rationalized by a game of player rank at most
2σ(D) + 1.
Proof. Below we show that there exists a payoff matrix A of rank at most 2σr(D)+1 that rationalizes
the row player’s strategies in D. A similar argument establishes the existence of a matrix B (which
rationalizes the column player’s strategies) of rank no more than 2σc(D) + 1, and hence we get the
desired claim.
Say {D1,D2,D3} is a 3-partition that satisfies dim(Oc(D1))+max(x,y)∈D2 |Supp(x)|+κr(D3) =
σr(D). The constructions of Theorems 2, 3, and 4, imply that there exist matrices A1, A2, A3 of
rank dim(Oc(D1)), 2max(x,y)∈D2 |Supp(x)|+ 1, and 2κr(D3) respectively such that Ai rationalizes
the row player’s observations in Di for all i ∈ [3].
Since Oc(D) is generic, there exists matrix Vi for all i ∈ [3] that satisfies the following equalities:
Viy = y ∀ y ∈ Oc(Di)
Viy = 0 ∀y ∈ Oc(D) \ Oc(Di)
Note that payoff matrix A =
∑3
i=1AiVi rationalizes the row players observations in D and is of
rank at most 2σr(D) + 1.
This result serves as another illustration of why player rank is an appealing choice for the
revealed preference exercise in this paper, since it allows us to merge the constructions used in
Theorems 2, 3, and 4.
5 A Lower Bound on Player Rank
The results to this point of the paper have focused on constructing rationalizing games with low
player rank, thus guaranteeing the observed equilibria can be computed efficiently. It is also natural
to ask if there exist data sets that require rationalizations to have large player rank. In the following,
we show that such data sets do exist. In particular, there exists a data set that requires any
rationalization to have player rank at least n− 1.
Theorem 5. Any game (A,B) that rationalizes D = {(uk, uk) | k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}} has player rank
at least n− 1, i.e., rank(A) ≥ n− 1 and rank(B) ≥ n− 1.
Proof. For 2 ≤ k ≤ n, recall that uk ∈ ∆
n denotes the uniform distribution over the set {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Consider the following data set with n− 1 observations, D = {(uk, uk) | k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}}.
Note that the data set D is rationalizable. In particular, the game obtained by setting the
payoff matrices of both the players to In (the n × n identity matrix) rationalizes D. The player
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rank of the rationalization, (In, In), is n. Below we establish that in fact the player rank of any
game that rationalizes D is at least n− 1.
Say (A,B) is a rationalization of D. Let A(i) be the ith row of the matrix A and for 2 ≤ j ≤ n,
we define n − 1 vectors vjs as follows: vj := A(1) − A(j). Note that vjs lie in the row space of A.
We will show that vjs are linearly independent and hence get that the dimension of the row space
of A is at least n− 1. This, in turn, proves that the rank of A is at least n− 1. Since the data set
D is symmetric, via a similar argument, we can establish that the rank of B is no less than n− 1.
This overall establishes the stated claim that the player rank of (A,B) is at least n− 1.
Since mixed strategy pair (uk, uk) is a strict Nash equilibrium in (A,B), we have e
T
1 Auk = e
T
j Auk
for all j ∈ {2, . . . , k} and eT1Auk > e
T
j Auk for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. That is, A
T
(1)uk = A
T
(j)uk
for all j ∈ [k] and AT(1)uk > A
T
(j)uk for all j /∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. We can rewrite these equalities and
inequalities using the definition of vjs as follows:
vTj uk = 0 ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , k} and
vTj uk > 0 ∀j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}.
Hence, for all 2 ≤ k < n, vector v2, v3, . . . , vk+1 are linearly independent. Say for contradiction
that they are linearly dependent. Then we can write vk+1 as a linear combination of v2, . . . , vk,
i.e., vk+1 =
∑k
j=2 λjvj . Taking inner product of both sides of this equation with uk leads to a
contradiction.
Overall, we get that the vectors v2, . . . , vn are linearly independent and this completes the
proof.
This result is important for two reasons. First, the theorem highlights that Theorems 2, 3, and
4 are (nearly) tight. Specifically, by construction, data set D′ satisfies: (i) the observed strategies
of each player lie in a subspace of dimension n− 1; (ii) each observed strategy has support size at
most n; and (iii) the chromatic number of the data set is n − 1. It follows immediately that the
bounds in Theorem 2 are exactly tight, and the bounds in Theorems 3 and 4 are tight to within a
factor of 2.
Second, the lower bound strongly suggests that adding computational constraints to the theory
of Nash equilibrium has testable implications, i.e., it is likely that there exist data sets for which any
payoff matrices that explain the data sets require players to solve computationally hard problems
when computing the observed equilibrium. This is in contrast with single-person consumer theory
[11]. It is still possible that rationalizing games could be simple, but it seems unlikely. Investigating
this issue further is an intriguing direction for future work.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Our work is the first to consider the implications of computational complexity for mixed strategy
behavior in games with multiple players. For our results we make certain simplifying assumptions
that are natural given prior work on revealed preference theory for a single agent and on the com-
putational complexity of equilibrium. In this section we discuss these assumptions, their relaxation,
and interesting open problems.
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Observations of exact mixed strategy behavior. We assume that exact mixed strategy
behavior is observable, and ignore the presence of noise in our observations. This assumption is
justified as our results would be easier to establish under the extra flexibility afforded by noisy
observations. Further, while a number of other observations can be considered as possible inputs,
e.g., pure strategy samples from a mixed Nash equilibrium, the model of observations we consider
for mixed strategies is the natural first step. The assumption that exact mixed strategy behavior
can be observed is also made in the theory of individual stochastic choice, e.g., [16–19]. In the
theory of individual stochastic choice, these models have developed into actual empirical tools that
are very heavily used among economists (for example, they are used as a standard tool by most
empirical economists). See [4] for an exposition of the theory as used by empiricists.
Repeated observations from the same game. The data sets considered in this paper com-
prise of multiple observations of mixed-strategy behavior that potentially correspond to different
equilibria. Superficially, this may suggest that one could consider observed player behavior as
resulting from a learning dynamic, or as outcomes from a repeated game. However, given the
“anything goes” message of the folk theorem (see [12]), studies in experimental economics are often
designed explicitly to avoid repeated game behavior. This is typically enforced through anonymous
and random matching experimental designs. Thus, Nash equilibria is often the model of interest.
Further, considering repeated games or learning dynamics would again involve relaxing some of the
constraints considered in the current paper, since it would no longer be required that the payoff be
maximized at each observed strategy profile. It is likely that these relaxations would make it easier
to provide explanation of the data via tractable payoff matrices.
Alternate notions of tractability. Our results provide strong motivation for the use of player
rank as a notion of tractability; however there are many other properties which ensure the existence
of efficient algorithms for computing Nash equilibria. These include: a game rank of zero or one,3
where the game rank is the rank of C := A + B; the existence of a potential function; or the
existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. None of these properties is appropriate for use in the exercise
here because each is binary: either a data set possesses the particular property, or it does not; and
absence of the property renders algorithms based on the property useless in computing equilibria.
Further, in Appendix A, we show that for each property other than player rank, simple data sets
with a small number of observations necessitate rationalizations that do not satisfy the property.
Genericity of the observations. Theorems 3 and 4 assume that the set of observations are
generic. For games with n pure strategies for the players, if the number of observations are less
than n, this is a mild assumption, since a tiny perturbation is sufficient to ensure genericity. The
assumption does necessitate that the number of observations be at most n. Since computational
complexity is interesting for large values of n, our work is still relevant for large classes of data.
From a technical point of view however, it would be very interesting to see if this assumption could
3If the game rank is 3 or larger then the computation of a Nash equilibria is PPAD-hard [20].
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be removed; or if our computational complexity results could be extended to other classes of data
sets.
Learning versus testing. Our focus in this paper is on testing. We do not address the related
problem of inference in this paper. The problem of actually learning the underlying payoffs of players
by observing player behavior has previously been studied for the case of a single consumer [6, 29]
and for correlated equilibrium with multiple players [28]. Our work, while primarily focused on
testing, does offer some insight into how structural properties of the observed behavior affect the
rank of the payoff matrices we are trying to learn. A more comprehensive study of learning the
underlying utilities of players in game-theoretic settings is an important direction for future work.
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A Game Rank, Potential Games, and Pure Strategy Equilibria
The goal of this paper is to understand when it is possible to rationalize data via payoff matrices for
which the mixed strategies observed are efficiently computable. Given the hardness of computing
equilibria in general, this requires that the rationalizations we generate must have some special
property that allows for efficient computation. We do this by focusing on rationalizations with
small player rank; however there are a number of other properties that could be considered. For
example, a small game rank, the existence of a potential function, or the existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium. In the following, we highlight that these alternatives are not well-suited for use in this
paper.
A.1 Game Rank
The connection between game rank and computational efficiency has only recently begun to be
understood. To this point, polynomial-time algorithms to compute Nash equilibria are known
when the game rank is either zero [21] or one [2], and it has recently been shown that when the
game rank is four or more computing an equilibrium is PPAD-hard [20]. Though incomplete,
these results are already problematic for the use of game rank in this paper. In particular, the
following result highlights that only very small data sets can be guaranteed to have game rank
small enough to ensure that a computationally efficient algorithm exists, e.g., there is a data set
with 9 observations that necessitates game rank of at least two.
Theorem 6. There exists a rationalizable data set D with 2n+1 observations such that any game
(A,B) that rationalizes D has game rank at least n− 2, i.e., rank(A+B) ≥ n− 2.
Proof. Let un ∈ ∆
n be the uniform distribution over [n] and ek ∈ ∆
n be the vector with a 1 in the
kth coordinate and 0’s elsewhere. Write vk to denote the uniform distribution over [n] \ {k}. We
consider the following data set with 2n+1 observations, D = {(ek, ek) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n}∪{(vk, vk) | 1 ≤
k ≤ n} ∪ {(un, un)}. Note that D can be rationalized by the game (In, In), where In is the n × n
identity matrix.
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Say game (A,B) rationalizes D. First we show that in every column of A all the off-diagonal
entries are equal to each other. That is, for all k ∈ [n] and for all i, i′ ∈ [n]\{k} we have Ai,k = Ai′,k.
A similar result holds for the rows of matrix B.
Since (un, un) is a strict Nash equilibrium in (A,B) we have Supp(un) = βr(un). This implies
that all the components of the vector Aun are equal, i.e., the row sums of A are equal to each other.
Formally,
∑
j
Ai,j =
∑
j
Ai′,j ∀i, i
′ ∈ [n]. (2)
Similarly, the fact that (vk, vk) is a strict Nash equilibrium implies Supp(vk) = βr(vk). In
particular, for all i, i′ ∈ Supp(vk) the ith and the i
′th component of Avk must be equal to each
other. Since the ith component of the vector Avk is equal to
1
n−1
∑
j 6=kAi,j and Supp(vk) = [n]\{k},
we have the following equality for all i, i′ ∈ [n] \ {k}:
∑
j 6=k
Ai,j =
∑
j 6=k
Ai′,j. (3)
Subtracting (3) from (2) gives us Ai,k = Ai′,k for i, i
′ ∈ [n] \ {k}.
Finally, using the fact that (ek, ek) ∈ D we get that (k, k) is a pure and strict Nash equilibrium
in (A,B) for all k. Therefore, Ak,k > Ai,k for all i 6= k. Say the off-diagonal entries of the kth
column of A are equal to αk. We have Ak,k > αk and matrix A has the following form:
A =


A1,1 α2 α3 · · · αn
α1 A2,2 α3 · · · αn
α1 α2 A3,3 · · · αn
...
...
...
...
...
α1 α2 α3 · · · An,n


We can write A as the sum of a diagonal matrix and an outer product.
A =


A1,1 − α1
A2,2 − α2 0
A3,3 − α3
0
An,n − αn


+


1
1
...
1


(
α1 α2 · · ·αn
)
Write D to denote the above diagonal matrix and P to denote the outer product. We have
A = D + P . Note that all the diagonal entries of D are positive, since Ak,k > αk for all k.
Similarly, we can decompose column player’s payoff matrix B into a diagonal matrix D′ and an
outer product P ′, i.e., B = D′ + P ′. Like D, the all the diagonal entries of D′ are positive.
Overall, we have A + B = D + D′ + P + P ′. The rank of the sum of two matrices satisfies
rank(X + Y ) ≤ rank(X) + rank(Y ). Therefore, rank(D +D′) ≤ rank(A +B) + rank(−(P + P ′)).
Since P and P ′ are outer products, rank(−(P+P ′)) ≤ 2. The diagonal entries of both D and D′ are
positive, hence matrixD+D′ has full rank. This gives us the desired bound, rank(A+B) ≥ n−2.
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A.2 Potential Games
When a game has a potential function, it is termed a potential game, and an appealing property of
such games is that a pure strategy equilibrium is guaranteed to exist (e.g., [21]). Not surprisingly,
this property is limiting for the purposes of this paper. That is, if we were to use the existence
of a pure strategy equilibria as a property to yield efficient computability of an equilibrium in the
rationalizing game, then we would be restricted to extremely limited data sets. To see this, note
that there are very simple data sets that cannot be rationalized by a game that has a pure Nash
equilibrium, and consequently cannot be rationalized by a potential game.
Theorem 7. There exists a rationalizable data set D with three observations such that any game
(A,B) that rationalizes D does not possess a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We consider a game where each player has 3 strategies, and a data set consisting of the follow-
ing three observations: ((1, 0, 0), (0, 1/2, 1/2)); ((0, 1, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/2)), and ((0, 0, 1), (1/2, 1/2, 0)).
Thus the row player plays a different pure strategy in each observation, while the column player
randomizes uniformly over two strategies. To see that any rationalization by matrices A, B does
not admit a pure Nash equilibrium, suppose for a contradiction that (i, j) is in fact a pure Nash
equilibrium and consider the matrix B. The data set enforces that the maximum entry in each row
is not unique, and hence no entry can be a strict pure Nash equilibrium.
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